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ABSTRACT
This paper examines piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Mexico, under the framework of 
maritime security. The results indicate that piratic attacks are most likely underreported by the 
Government of Mexico. The research findings documented fourteen attacks on supply vessels 
and offshore platforms for the first half of 2020; only three relevant attacks were officially 
reported in the same period by the vessel´s (foreign) flag jurisdiction. However, the Maritime 
Authority of Mexico did not change the security level at any of the ports or territorial sea during 
the incidents. The maritime security level remained the same (level 1) during 2020, despite 
several alerts launched by the international maritime community. Recommendations by the 
respondents (shipmasters, SSO, CSO and PFSO) recommended that a permanent increased 
security level (level 2) should be implemented in the Southern part of the Gulf of Mexico until 
this specific problem is resolved. Participants suggested additional special measures to tackle 
the problem including the evaluation to class the area as a High Risk Area (HRA) and the 
establishment of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOU), for international cooperation and 
capacity building with the US Coastguard authorities to promote necessary collaboration 
towards effectively dealing with these security threats.
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Introduction
Piracy and armed robbery attacks against vessels at 
anchoring areas of ports in the Southern Gulf of 
Mexico and oil platforms located in the region have 
increased significantly during the last three years. Only 
during the first seven months of 2020, research efforts 
have documented 14 piratical attacks, but only 3 of 
them were officially reported to the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) by the attacked vessel’s 
flag jurisdiction and not by Mexico, the State where 
these incidents occurred.
The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
(ISPS) Code, is one of the most important sets of maritime 
security regulations of international law, developed by 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO). These pro-
visions are established in Chapter XI-2 of the Safety of Life 
at Sea Convention 1974 (SOLAS Convention) and include 
crucial instruments to fight piracy, armed robbery and 
other type of transnational organized crime at sea, as the 
Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and respective 
Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), and the Ship Security 
Assessment (SSA) and Ship Security Plan (SSP). These 
solutions include a series of protocols for awareness and 
actions, to respond to security threats at sea, including 
piracy, armed robbery, terrorism, illegal trafficking of 
drugs, weapons, and illegal migration. The ISPS Code is 
a “comprehensive set of measures to enhance the secur-
ity of ships and port facilities, developed in response to 
the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States” 
(International Maritime Organization 2012).
Part A of the Code establishes mandatory provi-
sions; the not mandatory (“recommended”) part 
B encompasses guidelines explaining how to better 
comply with the mandatory requirements of part 
A. In any case, core instruments of the ISPS Code are 
security incident reports and security incident investi-
gation, as well as the IMO register of pirate attacks and 
armed robbery against vessels. Meeting the obligation 
on the part of States to report piratical attacks to IMO is 
vital in order to maintain transparent and reliable sta-
tistics, which are crucial as the first step in the response 
chain for allocation of resources by authorities and 
international organizations to tackle piracy.
Section 12.2, subsection 8 of the ISPS Code, establishes 
that among other duties and responsibilities of the Ship 
Security Officer (SSO) it is necessary to report all security 
incidents, which must be reported both to the maritime 
administration of the coastal State where the incident 
occurred and to the maritime authority of the vessel’s 
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flag jurisdiction. Furthermore, Section 17.2 establishes the 
duties and responsibilities of the Port Facility Security 
Officer (PFSO), including “reporting to the relevant autho-
rities and maintaining records of occurrences which threa-
ten the security of the port facility”.
Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld and Dalaklis (2017) have pointed 
out that the analysis of security incidents’ root causes is the 
cornerstone of “updating” the relevant security assessment, 
which was previously used as the base for the development 
of the security plan, with the aim to remove any loopholes. 
Additionally, if security officers identify new security threats, 
they must also implement the necessary adjustments. 
Cutting a long way short, “it is crucial to keep security incident 
records updated”, as the first indicator that there is room for 
further improvement.
Designated Maritime Authorities have already speci-
fied the type of maritime and port security incidents that 
must be immediately reported to them for official inves-
tigation in certain countries. Indicative examples include 
terror attacks; bomb warnings; hijack, armed robbery 
against a ship; discovery of firearms, drugs, weapons 
and explosives and unauthorized access to port facilities 
and restricted areas. In addition, security threats, breaches 
of security and security incidents, including date, time, 
location, response to them and the person-authorities to 
whom they were reported must be recorded and docu-
mented in the security incidents records (International 
Maritime Organization 2012).
Then, maritime authorities from member States have 
the obligation to report acts of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships to IMO, according to the MSC/Circ.623/ 
Rev.3,1 as approved by the Maritime Safety Committee, 
at its eighty-sixth session of June 2009. At the same time, 
they must conduct a maritime security incident investiga-
tion, which shall run parallel to the judicial investigation 
concerning the crime. The objective of such investigation 
is that the entire maritime community can learn the 
lesson and understand the causal factors of why 
a particular incident happened, preventing similar inci-
dents from reoccurring, avoiding similar mistakes in the 
future. It must be highlighted that in the case of very 
serious security incidents, as pirate attacks and armed 
robbery against vessels there must be a reassessment of 
the PFSA/SSA and adjustment of the PFSP/SSP, accord-
ingly, as required by the ISPS Code, which includes the 
increase of security levels.
As highlighted by Nordfjeld (2018), the IMO, has 
established three different security levels:
(1) Security Level 1(normal) requires the minimum 
protective security measures at all times,
(2) Security Level 2, which requires that additional 
protective security measures shall be main-
tained for a period of time as a result of the 
heightened risk or a security incident and,
(3) Security Level 3, which requires specific protec-
tive security measures which shall last only for 
a limited period of time when risk for a security 
incident is probable or imminent, even when it 
is not possible to identify the target.
Security Level 3 involves the strictest security measures 
and its priority is the security of the port, port facilities, 
vessels and society that may be affected by a security 
incident and may result in the suspension of commercial 
operations. Security response under Level 3 is transferred 
to the government or other organizations responsible for 
dealing with significant security threats/incidents.
The ISPS Code establishes that the process of set-
ting security levels focuses on the alert for the per-
ceived risk of terrorism attacks, but Member States can 
include other security threats in their risk assessment 
like pirate attacks and armed robbery against vessels 
and oil platforms. Maritime Security levels apply to 
ships sailing over the territorial sea and port facilities. 
However, governments can implement different secur-
ity levels for different ports, port facilities and different 
areas of their territorial waters.
In any case, the change of security levels must be 
communicated to the port, its port terminals and ves-
sels attempting to call that port or port facilities, as well 
as vessels in transit or attempting to transit those 
waters. The Maritime Authority must ensure that 
other relevant authorities and interested parties as 
terminal operators, ship owners, Flag Administration, 
P&I clubs and insurance´s representatives are notified 
in the case of serious security incidents as armed rob-
bery against vessels, and that they are given instruc-
tions about how to handle evidence material for the 
subsequent security incident investigation.
Research objectives
The objectives of this paper are the following:
(1) To study current security risks related to piracy 
and armed robbery against vessels and oil plat-
forms in the Southern Gulf of Mexico;
(2) To examine the response of the Maritime Authority 
concerning setting and change of maritime security 
levels as part of the response chain of the Maritime 
Authority from the Mexican Government to tackle 
pirate attacks and armed robbery;
(3) To analyse the impact of the lack of the imple-
mentation of a maritime transport policy with 
particular focus on a maritime security policy, 
including the respective allocation of resources.
The scope of the research study is on the Southern Gulf 
of Mexico; however, it can be applicable to other 
1Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews for preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.
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countries facing similar security threats and insecurity 
levels in the Latin American region, where there has 
also been registered malpractices concerning the offi-
cial report of pirate attacks and armed robbery against 
ships.
Theoretical background
Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships
Article 101 from the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) from 1982, establishes sev-
eral conditions for what type of unlawful actions can 
be considered piracy. These conditions include that 
the incident must involve violence, detention or depre-
dation and that it must occur on the high seas, outside 
the jurisdiction of any Government, as observed in the 
definition below:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act 
of depredation, committed for private ends by the 
crew or the passengers of a private ship or 
a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or air-
craft, or against persons or property on board 
such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in 
a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(a) any act of voluntary participation in the 
operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship 
or aircraft;
(b) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating 
an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
A certain number of pirate attacks occur within terri-
torial waters of different countries around the globe. 
There was an extensive disagreement among ship- 
owners and other shareholders with this definition 
since it left outside those incidents registered in the 
waters of a national jurisdiction. The Maritime 
International Bureau published their own definition of 
piracy, which disregarded the issue about this. As 
a response the Maritime Safety Committee, from IMO 
approved the revised circular MSC.1/Circ.1334 to 
revoke MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 on guidance to ship- 
owners, ship operators, shipmasters and crews for pre-
venting and suppressing acts of piracy and armed 
robbery against ships, at its eighty-sixth session, held 
from 27 May to 5 June 2009.
The revision was carried out on the guidance 
provided by IMO taking into consideration the 
work of the correspondence group on the review 
and updating of MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1, MSC/Circ.623/ 
Rev.3 and resolution A.922(22), established by 
MSC 84.
Under the new circular, the definition of “armed 
robbery against ships” was restructured, to reflect the 
view of France and other States articulating that the 
definition for armed robbery against ships should not 
be applicable to incidents committed seaward of the 
territorial sea. Also the motive of the act “private ends” 
was added.
The new definition reads: “Armed robbery against 
ships” means any unlawful act of violence or detention 
or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than 
an act of piracy, committed for private ends and direc-
ted against a ship or against persons or property on 
board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, 
archipelagic waters and territorial sea”. The 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) accepted both 
definitions and started to apply them in their register 
of security incidents from the IMB Piracy Reporting 
Centre, which is manned 24 hours to receive and reg-
ister reports of attacks or attempted attacks 
worldwide.
Circular MSC.1/Circ.1334 establishes that in addition 
to hijacking of ships, holding of the crew hostage, and 
the theft of cargo, other targets of the attackers 
include cash in the ship’s safe, crew possessions and 
any portable ship’s equipment and that therefore, the 
effective application of the ISPS Code is important and 
strongly encouraged.
It also encompasses a series of recommended prac-
tices suggested to owners or masters of ships operat-
ing in areas where attacks occur, which are based on 
reports of incidents, advices published by commercial 
organizations and measures developed to enhance 
ship security.
The ISPS code
The ISPS Code is an international regulation developed 
upon theories of risk management to secure ports, 
vessels, their crews and the marine environment, 
where information about threats, impacts and vulner-
abilities are used to assess the residual risk.
Concerning maritime security Capt. Hesse (2003), 
wrote that the rationale behind the new chapter XI-2 
and the ISPS Code of the SOLAS conventions is the 
approach of a risk management activity by determin-
ing which security measures are appropriate and 
necessary upon a risk assessment for each particular 
case. He added that the purpose of the ISPS Code is to 
pride a standardised framework for the evaluation of 
risk to enable governments to offset changes in threat 
levels according to changes in vulnerability of ships 
and port facilities. Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld (2018) con-
firmed that “The ISPS Code represents a structural 
change in port and maritime security management and 
should be seen as a basic framework for port and mar-
itime security, and international cooperation, covering 
specific standardised security measures”.
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The ISPS Code demands the development of a ship/ 
port security assessment and the respective security 
plan prepared through a six stage assessment, which 
are the following: (a) Pre-assessment; (b) threat assess-
ment; (c) impact assessment; (d) vulnerability assess-
ment; (e) risk scoring and; (f) risk management. The 
internationally known formula for risk is used, as fol-
lows: RISK = THREAT X IMPACT X VULNERABILITY.
The IMO (2012) has recognised as “high”, a residual 
risk score of 27 or more, which is considered unaccep-
table, and thus the ship/port must seek and implement 
additional control measures. While a residual risk score 
of between 8 and 24 has been declared as “medium”, 
which requires management monitoring; a residual 
risk score of 6 or less is considered as “low” or “toler-
able risk”, where no further control measures are 
needed.
Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld and Dalaklis (2017) 
explained that the ISPS Code “only applies to passenger 
ships, high speed passenger vessels and cargo vessels of 
500 gross tonnage and upwards. As well as Mobile 
Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) in transit and at ports 
(but not to fixed and floating platforms and MODUs on 
the oil field); and all type of port facilities serving vessels 
offered for international voyages”. The authors 
remarked that the “extent to which the guidelines 
apply on ships will depend on the type of the ship, its 
cargo and number of passengers, as well as its sailings 
routes and the features of the port of or port facilities 
visited by that specific ship. Regarding the application of 
guidelines to port facilities, it will depend on the type of 
carriages and vessels visiting that particular facility and 
its ordinary trading routes”.
As Avila-Zuñiga-Nordfjeld (2018), correctly pointed 
out, the ISPS Code does not apply to offshore activities. 
The IMO has left it up to member States to decide 
whether to extend its application to fixed Mobile 
Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) and floating oil plat-
forms, located in the Continental Shelf. The referred 
author recommended that for the case of Mexico and 
taking into consideration its level of offshore activities 
related to oil and gas exploration and production, they 
should develop their own regulation extending the 
application of the ISPS Code security measures to ves-
sels engaged in offshore activities, MODUs on location 
and to fixed and floating platforms.
According to the ISPS Code, the Ship Security 
Assessment and the Ship Security Plan must both 
include written procedures on measures to prevent 
or suppress pirate attacks and armed robbery. 
Circular MSC.1/Circ.1334 from IMO establishes that all 
ships operating in waters or ports where there has 
been registered piracy and armed robbery against 
vessels should carry out a security assessment as 
a preparation for development of measures to prevent 
an attack. The security assessment should take into 
account the following aspects:
(1) “the risks that may be faced including any infor-
mation given on characteristics of piracy or armed 
robbery in the specific area;
(2) the ship’s actual size, freeboard, maximum speed, 
and the type of cargo;
(3) the number of crew members available, their pro-
ficiency and training;
(4) the ability to establish secure areas on board ship; 
and
(5) the equipment on board, including any surveil-
lance and detection equipment that has been 
provided.
(6) The ship security plan or emergency response pro-
cedures should be prepared based on the risk 
assessment, detailing predetermined responses to 
address increases and decreases in threat levels”, 
IMO (2009b).
Ocean governance
Ocean governance means the coordination of various 
uses of the ocean and protection of the marine envir-
onment. It is also defined as the necessary process to 
sustain ecosystem structure and functions (Pyć 2016). 
This author adds that an effective ocean governance 
requires the implementation of globally-agreed inter-
national rules and procedures, regional actions based 
on common principles, and national legal frameworks 
and integrated policies.
These policies shall include aspects related to mar-
itime security as port and maritime security, piracy, 
terrorism, transnational organized crime, illegal migra-
tion, unlawful fisheries and proliferation of drugs and 
weapons. Some of the most substantial challenges of 
an effective ocean governance are associated to mar-
itime security.
The United Nation Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) provides the legal framework for 
national sovereignty rights and international obliga-
tions at sea. It also serves as the fundament for regional 
security cooperation, which is crucial to maintain safe 
and secure oceans and to protect the marine 
environment.
National maritime security policy
The Cambridge Dictionary (2020) defines policy as 
“a set of ideas or a plan for action followed by 
a business, a government, a political party, or a group 
of people”. It is also the driving force of an Organization 
(international, governmental, or non-governmental), 
guiding its decisions according to a strategic plan, 
generating rules etc., but differing from rules or law 
and therefore it must not be confused with politics.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
from the United Nations highlights the 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets (adopted 
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by world leaders in September 2015) build on the 
previous Millennium Development Goals aiming to 
achieve what the previous did not succeed. The 17 
SDGs apply to all countries worldwide, which must 
integrate them into their national policies.
As part of the United Nations, the IMO is working 
towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and the associated SDGs. Certainly, 
most of the SDGs can be linked directly or indirectly 
to maritime transport, as a natural facilitator of the 
world trade and global economy. “While SDG 14 is 
central to IMO, aspects of the Organization’s work 
can be linked to all individual SDGs, (IMO, 2020a).
The Development and implementation of a Maritime 
(Transport) Policy fortifies the maritime capacity, as well as 
the correct administration and exploitation of marine 
resources and appropriate protection of the marine envir-
onment, which contributes to the achievement of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs). While a maritime 
policy is wide encompassing, a National Maritime Transport 
Policies (NMTP) deals with specific maritime transport issues 
for a particular State following its national characteristics, 
challenges and interests.
A NMTP must include strategies and plans for the 
ocean/maritime governance, which shall be over-
arched by the national interests, based on 
a sustainable development, including an integrated 
coastal zone management. As well as the juridical 
framework, encompassing both the international and 
national dimension, which must reflect its sectoral 
interests established in the guidelines and principles 
of the ocean/maritime governance, which must follow 
its constitution, laws and regulations.
On this context, a National Maritime Security Policy 
(NMSP) is the part of the NMTP with own plans, strategies, 
human and material resources and guidelines aimed to 
secure its ports, the ports assets, its users, maritime share-
holders and its waters including its marine resources as well 
as vessels and their crews transiting its waters.
As mentioned before, one of the biggest challenges of 
an effective ocean governance are related to maritime 
security. Thus, it is a prerequisite to develop and implement 
a NMTP, including the essential part of the NMSP, since it 
requires international cooperation to face threats as piracy, 
maritime terrorism and armed robbery against vessels, bear-
ing in mind that securing oceans and the marine environ-
ment is an international duty, as it is the combat against 
transnational organized crime. The NMSP must also follows 
national and international regulations and particularly the 
ISPS Code.
Methodological approach
The research methodology includes semi-structured 
interviews conducted to Ship Security Officers (SSO) 
and Company Security Officers (CSO) working in the 
Southern Gulf of Mexico on board vessels or shipping 
companies with vessels sailing in that region. From the 
twenty persons invited to participate five of them 
rejected the invitation. Qualitative semi-structured 
interviews, based on a questionnaire encompassing 
30 different questions were employed to allow new 
viewpoints to emerge freely, particularly about opi-
nions and perceptions on security threats.
The purpose of the study was described to participants 
in an information cover-sheet letter where the research 
objectives were clearly described, explaining that their par-
ticipation was voluntary, confidential and without any eco-
nomic contribution or gifts. The total number of interviewed 
participants was 15 persons, all of them practicing in areas 
of maritime security. The interviews were conducted in May- 
June 2020, taped recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data 
was examined line-by-line, and the main categories and 
themes were identified and coded using thematic analysis 
and constant comparison of data.
The selection of methods was chosen because of its 
suitability in both, law and social sciences, disciplines 
where they are widely used, in accordance with the explora-
tory nature of topics related to security and criminology. 
They were considered appropriate for this case, where one 
of the general objectives is to study the diverse risks related 
to piracy and armed robbery against vessels and oil plat-
forms in the Southern Gulf of Mexico, as well as the 
response of the Maritime Authority of Mexico to tackle 
this kind of security threats.
McCracken (1988) stated that structured and semi- 
structured questionnaires with open questions, can 
help the researcher to avoid being obtrusive and enga-
ging in active listening strategies during the interview 
and enables to give order to the different subjects 
during the interviews, which simplify data analysis 
while developing categories or themes.
The research also employed the classical documen-
tal analysis to investigate the number of pirate attacks 
and armed robbery against vessels that occurred in the 
mentioned area during the period of 1 January– 
30 July 2020. The document analysis is based on data 
collected on armed robbery against vessels for 2020 in 
the Gulf of Mexico and particularly in the southern part 
of the gulf.
Representatives from the Secretariat of the Navy of 
Mexico were also asked to participate in the research 
effort, but they did not provide any respond to the 
invitation. Thus, researchers used press releases, media 
articles and document analysis to further analyse the 
response from the Maritime Authority to this growing 
problem in the Campeche Sound.
Results
On the basis of the semi-structured interviews 15 
themes were identified. They reflect a rather poor 
response from the Maritime Authority of Mexico to 
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the security threats that affect the Southern Gulf of 
Mexico. These themes are the following:
(1) Authorities from the Secretariat of the Navy 
(SEMAR) are not making the required incident 
investigation for reporting to the IMO.
(2) Piracy and armed robbery attacks increased 
significantly during the period of the COVID- 
19 pandemic.
(3) 86.6 % of the interviewed have several other 
roles on board the ship, in addition to SSO, as 
safety officers, radio operators, HLO and other 
administrative duties, which limits the time 
used for security duties.
(4) 26.6 % of them have never had access to the 
Ship Security Plan because the vessel and the 
master are from other nationalities and do not 
trust the SSO.
(5) In all cases where the ship was attacked or 
other ships in the proximity were attacked, 
the SSO increased the security level to level 2.
(6) It takes two hours or more to the authorities 
from the Secretariat of the Navy to arrive to the 
place of the attack, to provide help, but by 
then, the pirates have left the vessel.
(7) The Port Security Officer and authorities of the 
port have never increased the port security 
level to level 2, even during the attacks that 
resulted with injured people.
(8) 100 % of the participants interviewed SSO 
recommended to declare the area “High Risk 
Waters (HRA)” for the international maritime 
community.
(9) 100 % of the participants interviewed recom-
mended that the ports of the area increase the 
port security level to operate at level 2 always 
and until the number of attacks decrease to an 
acceptable security level.
(10) 60 % of the participants interviewed recom-
mend vessels sailing in the Southern part of 
the Gulf of Mexico to sail at security level 2.
(11) 40 % of the interviewed participants mean that 
it is not necessary to increase the security level 
of the vessel while sailing in the Southern part 
of Gulf of Mexico, but at the anchor area.
(12) 100 % of participants interviewed recommend 
to increase the ship security level to level 2 
while anchored at the anchor area or whenever 
anchored for oil exploration and production 
operations.
(13) 73 % of the interviewed says that the autho-
rities from the Secretariat of the Navy lack 
material resources as high speed patrols and 
combustible/fuel to perform vigilance duties.
(14) 100 % of the interviewed participants evaluate 
as very bad or none the response of the 
Secretariat of the Navy to the armed robbery 
and piratical attacks.
(15) 100 % of the interviewed participants believe 
that the use of private military security compa-
nies will increase the security risk due to the 
corruption in the country.
Concerning the documental analysis, the research effort 
documented a total of 14 piratical attacks of armed 
robbery against vessels during the period of 1 January 
to July 30 2020; from these, only three were officially 
reported by the attacked vessel’s flag (foreign) jurisdic-
tion to IMO, these are documented in Table 1, while the 
rest are reported with detail in table 2 below.
The documentation of all these pirate attacks and 
armed robbery against vessels emphasizes another 
very important finding for the entire international mar-
itime community, which is the serious underreporting 
of this type of maritime security incidents, committed 
in the ports of Mexico, its berths, anchorage areas and 
territorial waters by the coastal State of Mexico and its 
Maritime Authority to IMO.
General discussion
Due to this widespread malpractice of not reporting 
pirate attacks and armed robbery against vessels in the 
Latin-American region, there are not trustworthy sta-
tistics about maritime security incidents for this part of 
the globe, to make a realistic comparison with previous 
years. Yet, the interviewed SSO coincided that this kind 
of attacks against ships increased exponentially during 
the pandemic of COVID-19 in 2020 in the area.
Table 1. Acts of maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships officially occurred in the Southern Gulf of Mexico, reported by the 
attacked vessel’s flag (foreign) jurisdiction to IMO and not by the Coastal (Mexico) State, period 1 January-30 July 2020.
Acts of maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships officially reported by the attacked vessel’s flag (foreign) jurisdiction to IMO and not by the 
Coastal State,
(1) REMAS Supply offshore vessel, Italy 2600 g.t. IMO 9,586,459. Incident occurred on 10/04/2020 03:37 UTC. Around 13 nm NW of Puerto Dos Bocas, 
Mexico, around 13 nm NW of Puerto Dos Bocas, Mexico, Fired several warning shots, taking the crew as hostages.
(1) TELFORD 28. Barge Carrier Gibraltar. United Kingdom. 13,062 g.t. IMO 8,769,638. Incident occurred on 15/04/2020 03:30 UTC. Around 12 nm North of 
Ciudad del Carmen, Mexico 18° 51.94ʹ N, 091° 52.56ʹ W. Around six persons armed with automatic weapons and pistols boarded an anchored barge. 
One crew was injured during the incident (shooting with firearm).
(1) SAPURA 3500, Special purpose ship, Panama, 40,845 g.t. IMO 9,651,204. Incident occurred on 04/04/2020 02:06 UTC. HSP Platform, Offshore. Dos 
Bocas, Mexico, 18° 37.50ʹ N 093° 19.70ʹ W. Alarm sounded. Accommodation locked down and all crew mustered. Master was able to prevent the boat 
from coming alongside by using the thrusters.
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An average of 16 piracy and armed robbery attacks 
against vessels, MODUS, oil platforms and fishing ships 
is registered in the Southern Gulf of Mexico, (Infobae 
2019).
The United States through the US MARAD (Maritime 
Administration, 2020) launched the Alert 2020–004A, 
on Southern Gulf Of Mexico-Vessel Attacks. In this 
document, they established that the U.S. government 
is aware of at least 20 fishing vessels and 35 oil plat-
forms and offshore supply vessels that have been tar-
geted by pirates and armed robbers since 
January 2018 in the Bay of Campeche area of the 
southern Gulf of Mexico and that significant under-
reporting of attacks in this area is suspected. The 
alert adds that these attacks have involved the dis-
charge of firearms, crew injuries, hostage taking, and 
theft, according to details provided by the Office of 
Naval Intelligence’s on the 30 April 2020 Worldwide 
Threat to Shipping (WTS) report (US MARAD).
Similar alerts about this and the related security 
risks of the area have been published by other mar-
itime administrations worldwide, as the Ship Security 
Advisory Alert n. 04–20 by from the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands 2020. As well as the alert notice F-410 
(DDCM) V.01 from the Maritime Authority of Panama 
2020, where they remind “all Panama vessels transiting 
the Bay of Campeche, Gulf of Mexico and the State of 
Tabasco, in the Republic of Mexico to follow the 
PIRACY merchant marine circulars procedures and 
recommendations. Also, Panama Flag vessels under 
the SOLAS V/19 regulation must comply with LRIT 
and AIS requirements”.
29 maritime security incidents of this type occurred 
in Central and South America during 2019 according to 
MSC 4 Circ. 264, ANNEX 3 from IMO (2020b). As 
observed in Figure 1 below, it is clearly revealed that 
most pirate attacks occurred within territorial waters, 
followed by incidents committed in port areas, usually 
Figure 1. Acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships in South and Central America reported in 2019. Source: IMO (2020b).
Figure 2. Flow diagram for attacks in coastal waters & incidents report to IMO. Source: MSC. 1/Circ. 1334 Annex.
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at the anchorage areas while waiting for berth and 
only one of them happened in international waters, 
at the high seas. Figure 2, shows the flow diagram for 
attacks in coastal waters and the respective official 
report to IMO.
Yet, if a security incident of this type occurs, it not 
only must be officially reported to IMO, but addition-
ally, an official investigation must start and be com-
pleted to share it with the IMO, so the entire maritime 
community can learn from that particular attack. 
Resolution A.1025(26) from IMO and adopted on 
2 December 2009, on the “Code Of Practice for the 
Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships,” urges Governments “to implement the 
Code of Practice, to investigate all acts of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships under their jurisdiction, 
and to report to the Organization pertinent informa-
tion on all investigations and prosecutions relating to 
these acts so as to allow lessons to be learned from the 
experiences of ship-owners, masters and crews who 
have been subject to attacks, thereby enhancing pre-
ventative guidance for others who may find them-
selves in similar situations in the future”. This circular 
also calls Governments to develop international, regio-
nal and national agreements and procedures to sim-
plify and expedite cooperation for the application of 
efficient and effective measures to prevent acts of 
piracy and armed robbery against ships.
During interviews to various newspapers, representatives 
from the Maritime Authority of Mexico underestimated the 
gravity of the attacks and said that they were not consid-
ered maritime piracy, but rather robbery, since piracy must 
occur at the high seas.
Randrianantenaina (2013), discusses the zonal 
approach to the concept of maritime piracy as written 
in article 101, from the UNCLOS and says that certainly, 
it depends on which part of the maritime zones is 
perpetrated and adds that:
“Despite the fact that the definition doesn’t specify the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but only the high seas 
and a place outside the jurisdiction of any State, it 
applies to the EEZ in virtue of article 58(2) of the 
LOSC which indicates that articles 88 to 115 (Related 
to the high seas) are applicable to the EEZ as far as 
they are not contrary to the provisions regarding this 
maritime zone. As coastal States exercise only sover-
eign rights over non-living and living resources in the 
EEZ, it makes the provisions on piracy applicable to 
this maritime zone” Randrianantenaina (2013).
Though, the obligation from Government States to 
report security incidents to IMO, addresses not only 
acts of maritime, but also armed robbery against ves-
sels. While several incidents of those documented by 
the researchers in the Southern Gulf of Mexico were 
committed at the anchorage area of different ports 
from the area, several other against MODUS fixed at 
the oil field occurred in the EEZ.
From the information collected during the interviews it 
was subtracted that the pirates/robbers are armed with 
different type of weapons including assault rifles, shotguns, 
pistols, machetes and knives, targeting fixed MODUS and 
offshore infrastructure, as well as vessels anchored at the 
anchorage area of ports while waiting for berth, but not 
ships sailing. Moreover, they operate at night in small 
groups of 4 to 15 individuals, aboard several small fiberglass 
boats, hulled craft and fishing boats with multiple high- 
powered outboard motors enabling fast travel to the oil 
fields located between five and ninety-five nautical miles 
offshore and anchor areas. They use violence to take the 
crews as hostages while they steal around the vessel. It was 
also revealed that hey carry on frequency radios with access 
to the marine control and navy authorities radio bands (L 
Band) so they know when they are sailing and approaching 
the area to provide security to vessels in distress.
As part of the response from the Mexican Navy to tackle 
the problem, on 20 May 2020, the Secretariat of the Navy 
launched the “Operacion Refuerzo” (re-strengthening 
operation) to improve maritime security in the Campeche 
area. Through circular number 1631/2020 the Harbour 
Master from Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche, and based 
on circular UNICAPAM/DIGACAP/SONDA number 009/ 
2020 from 20 May 2020, declared the establishment of 
“Secured Areas of Anchorage” 2020, which were supposed 
to patrolled with the high speed patrols (patrullas intercep-
toras) BR-17 Y BR-18 and the oceanic patrol PC ARN 
OAXACA PO-161 .
In the same document, the Navy established the official 
control measures between vessels and the MRCC. In addi-
tion, they required the application of the ISPS Code to fixed 
oil-platforms and fixed MODUS, offshore supply vessels 
operating under cabotage and other type of vessels of 
less of 500 GT serving in the domestic market, including 
fishing vessels, but without making the necessary legal 
reforms. Thus, that requirement neither was supported by 
international law, nor by national law and the shipping 
companies and shipmasters were not legally responsible 
to follow such “obligation” (Circular n. 872/20-2020).
Nonetheless, participants of this study evaluated as 
very poor or non-existent the response by the Mexican 
Navy to the security incidents, and affirmed that “the 
navy patrols are at berth most of the time, because of the 
‘austerity programme’ from the Federal Government to 
save fuel and they are only moved after the incidents to 
collect the information,” (Respondent n.5). The limited 
budget allocated to the Navy by the government of 
Mexico might be a result of the lack of a maritime 
security policy. The IMO in cooperation with the 
World Maritime University delivered a workshop for 
the development of the MTP already back in 
November, 2018. However, it has not been made yet.
The majority of respondents recommended that 
ports of the area increase the security level to operate 
at level 2 and that shipmasters increase the ship secur-
ity level to level 2 while anchored at the anchor area or 
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whenever anchored for oil exploration and production 
operations.
These statements concurred with the fact that some 
vessels were also attacked at the “secured and guarded 
area” by the Secretariat of the Navy of Mexico, as the 
case of the Offshore Supply vessel Carson River, of 
Mexican flag on 13 July 2020. Indeed while the authors 
were doing the last revision of this article, another 
armed robbery occurred against the MODUS Coban 
A, located some nautical miles from the Port of Dos 
Bocas, in Tabasco Mexico, on the night of 
24 November 2020. Thus the recommendation from 
the respondents concerning the declaration of the 
Southern Gulf of Mexico as a High Risk Area (HRA) 
seems to be rational in order to increase security mea-
sures in the region and allow the international mari-
time community to be better prepared to meet these 
threats in those high risk waters.
As Bueger (2015) explains, the campaign against 
piracy included the work to define the affected territory 
and established the called “zones of exception,” which 
are special spaces in which particular forms of rules and 
regulations apply. Best Management Practices BMP3 
(2010), as analysed by Bueger (2015) established that 
“the High Risk Area for piracy attacks defines itself by 
where the piracy attacks have taken place”.
If the notion of “piracy attacks” is a clearly definable 
legal term, the notion of “piracy activity” is more ambig-
uous and open to interpretation. “Piracy” is in the BMP4 
not defined in legal terms, but as “all acts of violence 
against ships, her crew and cargo. This includes armed 
robbery and attempts to board and take control of the 
ship, wherever this may take place,” Bueger (2015).
Some of the control measures for a HRA include the 
establishment of a safe zone for shipping as an 
International Recommended Transport Corridor, 
which is usually protected by international naval 
missions. However, the declaratory of a HRA is 
a lengthy process that involves the whole world 
maritime community and cooperation with the 
Security Council of the United Nations and the 
Safety and Security committees from the 
International Maritime Organization. Thus in the 
meantime, some of the measures included in the 
Best Management Practices against piracy and 
armed robbery could also be implemented in the 
area to a certain extent in order secure ships and its 
crews and of course the marine environment, con-
sidering that the Campeche Sound is an area with 
high offshore activity.
Conclusions
Maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships in the 
Southern part of the Gulf of Mexico has increased 
significantly during the last years; results indicate that 
piratical attacks are severely underreported by the 
Government of Mexico.
The Maritime Authority from the Government of 
Mexico is not fulfilling its duties and obligations 
before the international community concerning the 
official report of incidents involving acts of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships, as established in MSC.1/ 
Circ.1334 from IMO (2009a), neither are they comply-
ing with the requirements of the ISPS Code with 
regards to the setting of maritime security levels in 
accordance with the perceived risk. This prevents 
vessels from foreign flags secure their ships and 
their crews when entering such risky waters. The 
lack of trustworthy statistical figures creates further 
difficulties towards the international cooperation for 
the implementation of security measures to secure 
such waters and ships sailing in the area. It is urgent 
that the Government of Mexico improves the security 
status of the area by correcting these malpractices 
and reports to IMO all acts of piracy and armed 
robbery allegedly committed against ships within its 
territorial waters and the EEZ.
The lack of a Maritime Transport Policy including 
the Maritime Security Policy (MSP) might negatively 
affect the security of the region. It is crucial that the 
Government of Mexico improves the security of the 
area with effective vigilance, changing from a reactive 
to a proactive approach.
Recommendations
(1) The development of a Maritime Security Policy 
by the Maritime Authority of Mexico, with 
respective strategies and specific actions to 
secure ports, vessels and their crews is urgent, 
including a proper allocation of human material 
resources to tackle the problem. The strategy 
shall include the combat of logistic infrastruc-
ture from pirates both at sea and onshore.
(2) It is highly recommended that ports from the 
Southern part of the Gulf of Mexico adjust accord-
ingly the security level under which they operate.
(3) It is recommended that vessels sailing the 
Southern part of the Gulf of Mexico remain vig-
ilant to security threats and ensure that all anti- 
piracy and armed robbery procedures and mea-
sures from the SSP are in effect.
(4) It is highly recommended that vessels anchored 
at anchor areas of ports from the Southern part 
of the Gulf of Mexico or whenever anchored for 
oil exploration and production operations oper-
ate under an increased security level.
(5) It is highly recommended to make the necessary 
reforms to extent the application of the ISPS 
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Code to offshore activities, cabotage and ferries 
as previously proposed by Nordfjeld (2018).
(6) It is recommended that special security mea-
sures should be considered for implementation 
in the Southern part of the Gulf of Mexico, 
including the evaluation of the HRA classifica-
tion, as suggested by respondents.
(7) It is recommended the establishment of 
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOU) for interna-
tional cooperation and capacity building with the 
US Coastguard authorities, to reduce security 
threats and protect the marine environment of 
the area, since an attack against a MODUS or 
a fixed platform would be a marine disaster that 
because of the marine streams would easily reach 
the US coast.
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